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Who defines failures of health care privatisation? 
 
 
There are extensive changes taking place in the public health care sector, globally, which have 
been described as the commercialisation of public health care. 1  Originating as part of neo-
liberal policies promoted by multi-lateral institutions in both high and low income countries, 
often as health sector reform, they take a variety of forms.  They cover the development of 
public-private partnerships, private finance initiatives, contracting out of services, including 
cleaning, catering, facilities management, the establishment of health insurance systems and 
the corporatisation of public sector institutions.  They are characterised as either adopting 
private sector practices by the public sector or as increasing the involvement of the private 
sector in public sector services.  The role of government in health care provision is changing.  
Private sector companies are becoming a growing presence in public health care systems.   
 
This paper refers to the overall process of commercialisation of health care but acknowledges 
the definition of privatisation as “the transfer of ownership and government functions from 
public and private bodies, which may consist of voluntary organization and for profit and not 
for profit private organizations”.2  The nature of privatisation processes in health care are often 
different to those of other utilities.  Although there are increasing demands for capital 
investment in high technology equipment, health care remains a labour intensive service and 
requires constant supplies of labour. This has influenced the private sector involvement in public 
health care systems, particularly the expansion of multi-national company activities, and has 
often restricted private sector expansion. 
 
There are several types of private sector involvement in public health care services which can be 
seen as part of a continuum of privatisation within the public health care sector.   
 Private sector contracted to run ancillary services 
 Private sector contracted to run clinical services 
 Public private partnerships – private sector invests in high technology equipment 
 Public private partnerships – private sector builds new hospitals and is contracted to run 
the hospitals on long-term management contracts 
 Private sector purchases hospitals 
 
Company goals to expand into the public sector market are influenced by the relationship that 
already exists between a company and the public sector.  The experience of contracting 
between companies and the public sector has contributed to the development of these 
relationships in Europe. The development and evolution of contracting in different countries has 
been part of the process of introducing market principles to the public healthcare sector. 3   In 
some countries, in the Nordic region, there has been a decade of experience built up between 
public commissioners and private providers.  This has led to companies in this region viewing 
their relationships with the public sector as mutually dependent.    
 
1. What is failure? 
 
There are national and regional differences in the ways in which the private sector has become 
part of the public health care sector.  The influence of the historical development of public 
health care systems, as well as existing arrangements, has often determined the relationship 
with the private sector.  This will also have some influence on how failure is defined and by 
whom.  In some countries, private healthcare providers provide for the public sector and are 
reimbursed directly, for example, France, and so they have a clearly defined role in relation to 
the public sector. In other countries, where public and private healthcare sectors are more 
separate, private healthcare providers deliver care to privately insured patients, for example, 
Germany, although reforms are moving towards direct privatisation of public sector hospitals.  In 
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other countries, the private sector is only just beginning to deliver clinical care services to the 
public sector. 
 
Any discussion of “failure” means starting from the meanings of failure.  Failure can be defined 
as “not succeeding or not being successful or non-performance”4.    In considering the failures of 
privatisation, the most important question is who defines the lack of success.  It is this question, 
which will be explored in these two examples of “failures” of privatisation.  There are an 
increasing number of stakeholders involved in processes of commercialisation and ultimately the 
privatisation of health care.   The main stakeholders are governments, at national, regional and 
local level.  The private sector may include local, national and multi-national companies.  
Health professionals constitute an important group, which are often segmented.  Patients and 
services users should be the focus of all services, but often find it difficult to articulate their 
interests, at all stages, in health sector reforms.  A growing interest group are financial investors 
who consider that short term investments in health care can provide high yields. 
 
This paper considers that the failure of privatisation can be viewed from three main 
perspectives:  
• Failure from the user view, characterised as restricted access to services and 
deterioration in the quality of services; 
• Failure from the company view, which entails bankruptcy and withdrawal from market; 
• Failure from the government view, where private sector providers are not providing value 
for money or are not effective. 
 
These two case studies will identify and analyse some of the processes that inform decisions 
about failure and the results of these decisions. They also show that failure in one specific case 
does not necessarily raise fundamental questions at national policy level, about privatisation 
overall.   This provides insight into the nature of the policy processes which are promoting 
commercialisation and privatisation of public health care. 
 
2. Mechanisms for private sector involvement  
 
The development of contracting by the public sector has led to refinements in methods of 
pricing health care.  There has been a slow process of identifying the total costs of public 
healthcare treatments. The private sector has been critical of how public healthcare systems are 
often unaware of their costs, implying that until the public sector is more realistic about its own 
costing and pricing, the private sector will not be able to compete effectively. This suggests that 
European private companies feel that they are working towards an “ideal” level of competition 
with public sector providers. 5 
 
Diagnostic related groups (DRGs) are a system of categorising patients based on diagnosis, 
treatment/ procedures, age and length of stay.  Categories establish a uniform cost of each 
category and a maximum price for reimbursement.  Medicare, the United States government 
health insurance programme, originally introduced DRGs in 1983 as a way of trying to control the 
Medicare budget.  The system is now being promoted and refined in many countries and is used 
in relation to resource allocation and pricing. 6  
 
Throughout Europe, diagnostic related groups (DRGs) are one of the most important and 
significant systems of pricing currently being introduced by governments.  Several multinational 
companies view this system as a positive contribution towards facilitating better engagement of 
the private healthcare sector with the public sector, although with some reservations. 7 Pricing 
systems are one form of infrastructure necessary for the development of healthcare markets.  
They feature strongly in these two case studies. 
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3. Failure as decided by a private company 8 
 
Fresenius is a German company, whose main activity is the manufacture of equipment and 
products for renal care.  The company is a key player in the global medical devices industry.  It 
has only recently become involved in delivering general health care services.  As the global 
medical devices industry is highly competitive and the manufacturing of equipment for kidney 
dialysis has currently little scope for innovation, Fresenius views the delivery of general health 
care services as an area of potential expansion.  Coming from the German healthcare system, 
the corporate company view sees opportunities in the privatisation of hospitals rather than 
becoming a provider for the public healthcare system.    
  
In 2001, the Fresenius Chairman, Gerd Krick, at the Fresenius Annual General meeting, pointed 
out that Fresenius ProServe, the international management division, had the potential to expand 
because “health systems, not only in Germany but all over the world, are in a state of change 
which is marked by increasing privatisation of hospitals and the demand for qualified, 
economically-efficient care of patients”.9  Krick predicted that, in Germany, the current 7% of 
hospitals operated privately would increase and there would also be an increase in integrated 
hospital services, where primary and secondary care are brought together. 
 
As part of its expansion into general health care management, Fresenius has acquired several 
German private health care companies, in the last five years.  Starting with the acquisition of 
Wittgensteiner Kliniken Group in 2002, Fresenius also acquired the HELIOS group in 2005, a 
German private hospital group, which has 55 hospitals and 26,000 employees.  The 
Wittgensteiner Kliniken Group was merged with the Helios Group.  Helios now operates as part 
of the Fresenius ProServe division.  In 2006, Fresenius bought the HUMAINE clinic group, with 6 
hospitals and 2,900 employees. 10 This shows how Fresenius has expanded into general health 
services management. 
 
In 2002, Herbolzheim hospital, north of Freiburg,  was taken over from the Wittgensteiner 
Kliniken AG and converted into the town hospital Herbolzheim GmbH. 11   The hospital had 135 
beds and became part of the Helios Klinik Group, owned by Fresenius.12  The Herbolzheim 
Helios-Klinik GmbH was 74% owned by Fresenius but the town council retained 26% ownership.  
Herbolzheim hospital is an interesting example because it was still part owned by the local town 
council.  This can be seen as a partial form of privatisation, but reflects an increasing trend, 
whereby private companies are involved in the public health care system but not to the extent 
of full privatisation.   
 
In October 2006, Fresenius/ Helios announced that it was going to return its 74% share ownership 
of the Herbolzheim hospital back to the town council because the hospital had become 
‘uneconomic’. 13   The reasons given by the company were that with better medical knowledge, 
improved treatments and shorter bed occupancy, it was not possible to run the hospital at a 
profit. This was set in the context of wider changes in the German health care system, which 
were higher VAT rates, increased energy prices and a small reduction of 0.07% of the health 
budget. 14  
 
Ver.di, the trade union, presented a different view of the crisis.   It considered that the recent 
announcement of closure of the hospital was a failure of privatisation of the hospital by Helios. 
Ver.di criticised the Mayor of the local town council, who was considered to have taken a “sales 
adventure” by pursuing the policy of selling 74% of the hospital ownership to Helios. 15   The 
management at the hospital was considered “chaotic”, with managers changing three times in 
three years.  There was no support given, for the hospital, by neighbouring Helios hospitals. 16  
 
Although the hospital workers took on longer working hours and gave up their holiday pay, this 
was not enough to stop the proposed closure of the hospital.  There was no employee 
participation and there was no functioning works committee. 17  Ver.di felt that the Helios Group 
was not interested in providing health care services to the local population. 18  
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On 5 December 2006, the town council voted to take the hospital back into 100% local authority 
ownership.19 This was seen as the only solution available, unless the hospital was declared 
insolvent and was closed.  The local council wanted to avoid this so that it could continue to 
provide medical care and to maintain employment. 20 
 
Part of the agreement was that the local town council would take on two thirds of the staff of 
the hospital. 105 of the 160 hospital staff were taken on by a hospital in Emmendingen local 
authority.21  However, the remainder of the staff could not be taken on by the local 
Emmendingen hospital and so negotiations started between the Herbolzheim hospital 
management and the works council, about a possible social plan.  22 
 
The final agreement was that Helios would pay €2 million for the costs of redundancy for the 
hospital workers, who could not be relocated to local hospitals. A further €10 million was paid 
by Helios to clear any outstanding debts of the hospital, before handing over 100% of the 
ownership to the town council.  The agreement to pay off the debts of the hospital was a 
significant achievement because hospital debts often make it difficult to ‘save’ bankrupt 
hospitals.  What was not resolved was whether the €4 million that had been given to the 
company over the past 5 years would also be returned to the town council.23 
 
In the debates and negotiations that took place after the company announced that it would be 
returning the hospital to local authority ownership, there were some undercurrents of criticism 
of the local authority.  Questions were raised about whether the local council was aware of the 
financial position of the hospital and about the wisdom of the original decision to sell part of the 
hospital to a private company.  
 
Although the head of the Hurth District authority said that “The news has shocked  everyone”, 
he acknowledged the frustration and irritation of the local population.24  The priority was to 
incorporate the workers and hospital into other local hospitals.  The CDP country commissioner, 
Alfred Haas, said that ”Helios is responsible for the plight” of the hospital, firmly blaming the 
company, although the Herbolzheim hospital had not been incorporated into the regional care 
plan, a year before.25 
 
One of the reasons given, for the crisis at Herbolzheim Klinik, was the introduction, in 2003, of 
the diagnostic related groups (DRG) pricing system.  Under the DRG system, payments are made 
for a medical condition rather than a set of specific treatments.  There is no scope for adjusting 
prices to the circumstances of the hospital.  Smaller hospitals are paid the same price as larger 
hospitals, which may have better economies of scale.  This makes it difficult for smaller 
hospitals to compete. 26  
 
This example of privatisation failure shows that once a company views a hospital as 
“uneconomic”, it will act rapidly to get rid of the problem.  The company was not concerned 
about the loss of services to the local population.  This illustrates the dangers of involving the 
private sector in the provision of public services, without any agreements about maintaining 
public services. 
 
The case of Herbolzheim hospital also shows some of the results of local authorities, and the 
public sector, taking opportunities to sell assets to the private sector so that the private sector 
can make investments in new equipment and services.   Although, in this case, the local 
authority was willing to take the hospital back into local authority control, this cannot always be 
assumed.   The responsibility for providing health care services to local people has to be defined 
in any future contractual arrangements with the private sector.  Similarly the impact of new 
pricing systems needs to be monitored for all hospitals by the government. 
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4. Failure as decided by government  
 
The second case study examines the cancelled contract for the third ‘wave’ of Independent 
Sector Treatment Centres (ISTCs) in the United Kingdom.   In 2000, the UK government 
announced an increase in investment in the NHS, as set out in the NHS Plan. 27  In ‘Delivering the 
NHS Plan: next steps on investment, next steps on reform’, the Department of Health set out 
plans for the use of the extra investment.28  This included the creation of a network of 
Treatment Centres, described as a “network of fast-track surgery units”, which would reduce waiting 
lists.   Some of the new treatment centres were to be run by the NHS and some by the private 
sector.  £700 million per year was to be invested into these new centres.  The aim of a 
treatment centre was to streamline the process of consultation, diagnostic tests and surgery for 
common conditions, such as hip replacement and cataract surgery.  Some NHS treatment centres 
had already been developed as a way of improving the coordination of treatment and care.   
 
The significance of the independent treatment centres was that it was the first time that the 
private sector has been commissioned to provide clinical services for the NHS on such a large 
scale.  Twenty seven centres were planned initially, with 11 new buildings.  Local health care 
commissioners were expected to contract out 15% of clinical services to the private sector.   
 
Private companies were invited to build and run the centres, in some regions.  This was one of 
the biggest opportunities for the private sector to bid for contracts with the NHS.  The bidding 
process, initially, was arranged at national level by the Department of Health.  Bids were invited 
from the private sector, particularly international companies, in December 2002.  The first 
contracts were signed in September 2003.  The Department of Health was also keen to give 
contracts to international private health care companies, rather than UK private sector 
companies. 29 
 
Table 1: International companies awarded first ‘wave’ of Independent sector treatment centre 
contracts and number of procedures over 5 year contract period 30 
 
Companies Number of procedures 
Mercury Health Ltd 498,151 
Care UK Afrox Partnership Health Group 128,144 
Anglo Canadian/ Inter-health 33,817 
Nations Healthcare 276,680 
Birkdale Clinic 5,959 
Netcare UK 89,600 
Capio  93,441 
UK Specialist Hospitals   56,242 
Clinicenta 158,845 
 
All the initial contracts were with international companies, although some were partnered with 
UK companies. None of the main UK private health care providers were commissioned in this 
first phase.   Netcare and Afrox are South African private health care companies.  The South 
African private health care market is saturated and two of the largest companies saw the 
opportunities in the UK as a strategy for international expansion. 
 
A number of issues have emerged in the implementation of the Independent Sector Treatment 
Centres (ISTCs).  These include questions of value for money, overpayment, prices, contractual 
arrangements, threats to doctor training, staff, lack of data collection, and changes to NHS 
referral systems, 
 
Value for money 
The contract negotiations were undertaken by the Department of Health on behalf of local 
commissioning agencies (Primary Care Trusts). Soon, there were several cases of local health 
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commissioners refusing to accept a treatment centre contract.  A majority of local NHS chief 
executives did not think that the new centres were “value for money”.   
 
Many of the major criticisms have been made in relation to the terms of the contracts awarded 
to private companies. Many were awarded five year contracts to treat a set number of patients.  
The terms of the contract allow the private company to be paid even if it does not treat the 
number of patients stated in the contract.  The result of this arrangement is that local NHS 
health service commissioners have to continue to pay for the contract, even if the number of 
patients being treated is less than that originally contracted.  This is effectively money lost to 
the NHS. 
 
It is estimated that an Independent Sector Treatment Centre (ISTC) in Greater Manchester, 
which is run by Netcare, the South African company, lost £2m to the local NHS in its first six 
months. 14 local health services commissioners paid £1.9m to Netcare for operations that were 
not carried out because patients opted for traditional NHS care.  Conseqently the ISTC only 
performed 4,000 out of 6,000 contracted operations, yet under the contract Netcare was paid 
for the full amount.  31  This also led to local health commissioners paying local doctors a bribe 
to refer patients to the ISTC.   An investigation by Hospital Doctor magazine found GPs in the 
area were being paid £30 for every patient sent to Greater Manchester ISTC. 32 
 
In 2006, details emerged of “residual value" packages, which are agreed sums to be paid to the 
private companies for their facilities should their five-year contracts not be renewed. Some 
companies may be receiving up to £25 million more than the NHS would, for a similar service. 33 
 
In August 2007, the Department of Health announced that the ISTC programme was running 16% 
under capacity but the remaining £222 million is still being paid because the contracts that were 
negotiated with the private companies, agreed to pay in full whether or not the NHS sends 
patients.  34  The NHS, at local level, is still having to pay even though there are no patients.35  
PCTs are “locked” into 5 year contracts.  There were also problems of local monitoring as 
responsibility for ISTCs at local level were hard to identify. 36 
 
Costs and prices 
It has been difficult to obtain information on the prices of operations undertaken by ISTCs.  The 
Department of Health has admitted that the costs are 11.2% higher than NHS equivalent costs, 
which are higher than the NHS tariff (standard costs). 37 This can be illustrated by the example 
of cataract operations in Portsmouth. 
 
In 2006, every cataract operation at the Mercury Healthcare ISTC at St Mary's Hospital, 
Portsmouth, cost £5,590 compared to the standard NHS price of £847. The public has so far paid 
£335,412 for 60 cataract operations at the private-sector centre, since it opened on December 
19 2005.   The same number would cost £50,820 at an NHS hospital. Mercury Healthcare has an 
£84m, five-year contract, with local NHS commissioners.   The contract states that Mercury 
should carry out 1,650 cataract operations a year, but the company gets paid whether patients 
are referred or not. The government also pays out an extra 20% to compensate Mercury for 
setting up the £10m centre. 38 
 
Staff training 
By 2005, there was alarm at the scope that the new ISTCs would have for poaching NHS staff.   
The British Medical Association raised its concerns at the scope for international companies to 
take on NHS staff.39  Although the first wave of ISTCs were not allowed to poach NHS staff, the 
second wave were allowed to take NHS staff on secondment.40  International companies have 
recruited international doctors, who are often untrained in NHS systems and procedures.  As a 
result there have been a growing number of complaints about the quality of care received in the 
ISTCS. 
 
There was also concern, by doctors, that by sending routine surgery to the new ISTCs, the NHS 
was in danger of being left with the more complicated surgical cases.  This has implications for 
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training of junior doctors who depend on routine surgery for practice.  This was also admitted by 
the Department of Health’s Head of access, policy development and capacity, Bob Ricketts.  In a 
statement to the Health Select Committee (2006), he stated that doctors' training is being put at 
risk by the government's introduction of independent treatment centres”. He felt it was the 
"biggest issue" to do with the ISTC policy. Strategic Health Authorities, in charge of local 
governance and monitoring, would be expected to monitor training. 41 
 
In the report to the Select Committee, the Department of Health, stated that in next stage of 
ISTCs, the centres would be expected to provide training. 42 This is a very significant change in 
training provision for NHS doctors because it is involving private providers in the mainstream NHS 
training process.    
 
Lack of data 
There is growing evidence that data collected by the ISTCs is often incomparable to NHS data.  
In addition, secrecy at the Department of Health has made it difficult for Parliamentary Select 
Committees to review the scheme.  The Department of Health refused to publish the 
methodology that it used to evaluate contract bidders, nor to provide the business cases of the 
successful bidders. 
 
The issue of lack of data was highlighted in a report from the Healthcare Commission, the 
government health care regulator.  The Healthcare Commission found that it was unable to 
evaluate the ISTCs because there was a lack of data available to compare them to NHS services.  
There were fewer patients treated by the ISTCs than had been expected but the centres are still 
being paid for operations even when not performed.  The director of the Healthcare Commission 
commented that the emphasis on speed for setting up the new centres meant that systems for 
collecting data had not been set up. The Department of Health had asked companies to collect 
data, as part of their contract, but this was not data at patient level and so could not be 
compared to the NHS.  The first wave of ISTCs were asked to report “key performance 
indicators” as well as routine NHS statistics.  However, much of this routine data has not been 
collected. The Healthcare Commissions observed that the emergency readmission rates for hip 
replacements was similar to NHS rates but said “This is perhaps unexpected, given the mix of 
patients treated at ISTCs, which excluded those with the most complex needs”. 43 This suggests 
a slightly higher emergency admission rate. 
 
Longer strategic goals  
Within eighteen months of the first ISTCs opening, there were examples of underuse by local 
commissioners.  By 2005, the government had to admit that the contracts used for the private 
sector gave them an unfair advantage over NHS  hospitals. 44   It emerged that, as part of the 
invitation for bids for the second wave of ISTCs, “the primary purpose of the contracts would be 
to help create a "sustainable" market in the provision of elective care to NHS patients and 
encourage competition between NHS and private providers.”  Private providers would also be 
given an opportunity to take over NHS buildings and equipment. 45 
 
Changes in NHS referral systems 
In January 2007, the British Medical Association (BMA) drew attention to proposals designed to 
cut hospital waiting lists by creating a network of private centres under contract to the 
government that would assess and test patients before they are allowed to get treatment as 
hospital outpatients. The private medical chain Netcare will set up 10 centres in the north west 
of England, where the company expects to be able to deal with 60% of patients without needing 
to send them for an assessment by an NHS consultant.   This means that GPs will lose their right 
to refer NHS patients to a hospital consultant.46 
 
 
Change of policy 
Already by May 2006, not all ISTCs in the second wave were being commissioned by the 
Department of Health. 47 This was partly because there were too few bidders, which suggests 
that the private sector was having concerns about the viability of the centres.  Almost a year 
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later, in July 2007, the new Brown government signalled a change in policy towards ISTCs.  The 
new Health Secretary Alan Johnson announced in July 26 2007 that there would not be a third 
wave of ISTCs.  He also sacked a private sector provider, US IT company Atos Health care, for 
failing to deliver a contract for diagnostic services in two regions in England.  48 
 
These announcements caused a certain degree of alarm for private health care providers and the 
private sector more generally, for example the Confederation of British Industry.  There were 
accusations of “being in retreat” over ‘Blairite reforms’.  The health secretary made it clear at 
the Select Committee that if the private / independent sector was inefficient or not offering 
good value for money or high quality patient care then the contract would be terminated.   
 
Health care analysts for the private sector have predicted a slowing of private sector contracts 
with the NHS.  Perhaps an indication of this was the sale by BUPA, of its acute hospitals, so that 
it could concentrate on social care and international expansion. 49 Another dimension of this 
process is how the private sector has changed during this period. 
 
Netcare, a South African company, expanded from four hospitals in 1996 to a current total of 62 
hospitals. Netcare International operates in the UK and the Middle East as a healthcare 
management company.  A significant expansion for Netcare, was its entry into the British 
healthcare market in 2002.  The company is currently fulfilling a five-year contract to perform 
44,500 cataract operations for the NHS via mobile services. The Greater Manchester Surgical 
Centre (GMSC) is a newly built facility attached to the Trafford General Hospital where 
specialists from Netcare UK perform elective orthopaedic, ENT and general surgical procedures. 
50   
 
In 2006, Netcare acquired, with funds advised by Apax Partners Worldwide LLP, London and 
Regional Properties and funds advised by Brockton Capital LLP the General Hospital Group (GHG) 
in the UK. Netcare will own 50.1% of GHG in return for an investment of approximately £217m, 
along with the injection of its wholly owned UK subsidiary Netcare Healthcare UK Limited. 
Netcare cited the limited opportunities for acquisition in South Africa as the reason for the 
General Health Group purchase.51 
 
Netcare, as seen through an account of a Strategy Day in August 2007, thinks that there will be a 
reduction on of resources for the UK NHS which will lead to rationing and the introduction of 
user fees.  The company sees opportunities for the development of personal medical insurance, 
following the decrease in resources going into the NHS.52 This illustrates how private companies, 
providing healthcare to a publicly funded system, also consider possibilities for an expansion of 
private healthcare.  
 
This account of Independent Sector Treatment Centres illustrates some of the results of 
involving private sector providers in the public health care sector, the NHS.  One of the biggest 
problems of the ISTC programme has been the way in which contracts were drawn up.  The 
government wanted to introduce the ISTC programme as quickly as possible.  This meant that 
the whole initiative was driven by national government but local commissioners had to deal with 
the consequences of unrealistic contracts.  There are signs that the Department of Health has 
recognised some of these problems. 
 
ISTCs have also affected the “local health economy” and impacted on NHS providers at local 
level.   There are examples of closures of wards and staff being made redundant as a result of 
new local ISTCs.  The involvement of the private sector in training of doctors introduces a new 
dimension to medical training.  There is also evidence that the process of involving the private 
sector in clinical service provision has resulted in some significant changes in practice in the 
NHS, which may compromise the public nature of the service in future. 
 
The closure, in May 2008, of the Department of Health Commercial Directorate, which had been 
setup in 2003 to be responsible for the procurement of the ISTCs, was a further sign that the 
approach by the Department of Health was changing.53   The functions previously delivered by 
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the Commercial Directorate have been taken on by the Finance, Performance and Operations 
Directorate.  The Commissioning and System Management Directorate is promoting a new 
opportunity for private sector involvement in the NHS by inviting a group of international 
companies to bid for contracts to commission services in the NHS.   However, although there 
were some failures of the ISTC initiative, it has not persuaded the Government to abandon the 
use of the private sector.  This current phase of drawing in private sector providers may be 
evolving into a more complex relationship between private sector providers and the NHS. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
The failures of Herbolzheim hospital and the third ‘wave’ of Independent Sector Treatment 
Centres (ISTCs) show that what follows on from a ‘failure’ can result in a return of services to 
the public sector or it can result in an adjustment to the policy, but not necessarily an 
abandonment of the privatisation process.  Fresenius, the owner of Herbolzhiem Hospital, will 
not necessarily change its policy of buying private hospitals. The local authority may be more 
circumspect about selling off assets.  In the UK, the Department of Health has not abandoned 
the process of contracting out services to the private sector.  It is about to contract out the 
commissioning of health services at local level, an even more fundamental change than 
contracting clinical services to the private sector. 
 
The roles of government, at local and national level, are changing.  The new public management 
literature sets out the functions of the enabling state.54 However, what is not explored fully, are 
the stages of change that governments are going through.  Governments do not immediately 
change from being providers of services to commissioners.  Effective commissioning requires 
skills that many civil servants have not developed.  Even more importantly, the influencing 
processes that the private sector is using to get access to public service contracts, are 
sophisticated. 55 Governments are not always able to counter some of these influences. 
 
In the UK, one of the most significant events in the account of ISTCs is the report published by 
the Healthcare Commission, the government regulator, which criticised the lack of data 
available to compare the practice of the ISTCs with the NHS.   The failure of government to 
ensure that rigorous and adequate data is collected shows that it is also failing in its role of 
regulator. 
 
Health care pricing is central to the commercialisation of health care.  The impact of new 
systems of pricing was influential in both the case of a small district hospital and a national 
initiative of privatising clinical care.  The system of setting prices and the secrecy which 
surrounds the contracting process are two tools that push forward the process of privatisation.  
There is a need for greater transparency about the way in which health care is costed and a 
debate about the appropriateness of converting a health care service into a series of costed 
activities.    
 
Whatever the success or failure of individual initiatives in the public health care sector, the 
private sector is establishing a growing presence in the sector.  Whether the companies view 
future profits that result from the contracting process or from a future where health insurance 
and individual user fees are the norm, the role of government and users as monitors and 
regulators needs to be strengthened.  One of the reasons why the Department of Health in the 
UK has partly succumbed to pressure to abandon the third wave of ISTCs is because of the 
publicity that Parliament, the Healthcare Commission and campaigners have generated about 
the failings of ISTCs.   
 
Health care is a labour intensive activity.  How health workers are treated and the role that they 
play in the process of privatisation will influence the nature of the public health care services in 
the future.  In the short term, failure of privatisation may result in job losses.  In the long term, 
some of the changes that are taking place will also affect the way in which health workers are 
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trained.  Many heath care multinational companies, including Fresenius and Netcare, have their 
own training colleges for health workers. This influence has the potential to affect the way in 
which health care services are delivered, in the future.  Maintaining a publicly funded training 
and education system for health workers is central to the future of public health care services. 
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